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SIHIhnkh-T DF ISSUES PRESENTED OH RPPERL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REUIEU
1.

Did the trial

Pierce,

the

lawful

court

possessor

incorrectly
of

conclude

vehicle,

waived

that
his

standing to contest the seizure of the marijuana found in
the trunk as the result of his illegal detention?
Utah

case

law

is clear

that

"a driver

who

has

permission to use a vehicle and has personal belongings in
the car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car
and its contents."

State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 916

(Utah flpp. 1992).

Whether

defendant

has

a

legitimate

expectation of privacy i3 reviewed "under a correction of
error standard, affording no deference to the trial court."
State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) citing
State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah Rpp. 1992).
2.
Pierce

Did the trial
abandoned

his

court

incorrectly

expectation

of

conclude

privacy

in

that
the

marijuana in the trunk by his statement that the only thing
that was his was the backpack

given the

fact

the the

statement was made in response to a question about

the

contents of the back seat and at the scene he acknowledged
possession of the marijuana?
A.

A statement claiming ownership of one item

in one area of a vehicle does not constitute abandonment of
expectation of privacy In rest of vehicle and its contents.
A mere disclaimer of property interest in insufficient to
establish abandonment. State v Rowe. 806 P.2d 730,746 (Utah

1

rev'd

flpp. 1991,
1992).
B.

on other

ground^;

850 P.2d 42? (Utah

Intent to abandon is viewed from defendant's

state of mind and is a question of intent to voluntarily
relinquish a reasonable expectation of priuacy, which may
be

inferred

from

"uiords spoken,

acts done,

and

other

objective facts". State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730, 736.
C.

The burden of proving abandonment falls on

the state, and must be shown by "clear, unequivocal and
decisive evidence". State v. Rome, 806 P.2d at 736.
D. fl trial
defendant

had

reviewed

under

a

court's conclusion as to whether

legitimate
a

expectation

correctness

of

standard,

privacy

affording

is
no

deference. State v. Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Rpp.
1994); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah flpp.
1992).
DETERH1HRTIUE CONSTITUTIONAL PRQUISIONS. STRTUTES. RULES
Texts set forth in the addendum.
For location in brief please see table of contents.
STRTEHEHT OF CRSE
fl.
This

Nature of the Case
is an appeal

motion to suppress.
and

a charge

violation

from an order

denying

Pierce's

The case involves a) a traffic stop

of Speeding, a Clas3 C

of § 41-6-46, Utah

Misdemeanor,

Code Annotated,

1953

in
as

amended, and b) a vehicle search and seizure of marijuana
resulting in charges of Possession of Controlled Substance
2

mini

IIILCIIL

LU

uisiriDuie,

a

inira Degree

felony,

in

violation of § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended and Failure to Comply with the

Illegal

Drug

Stamp Tax, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of § 59—19—
103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (Record 1-2).
B.

Course of Proceedings

On April 21, 1994 a preliminary hearing was held and
Pierce was bound over on all counts (A. 11-12).

On July

29, 1994, Pierce filed a Hot ion to Suppress and Memorandum
in Support (R. 23-38).

On August 3, 1994, prosecutor Halls

filed a Hemorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress (R.
67-77).
C.

Disposition at Trial Court

On August 5, 1994, a suppression hearing was was held
in Seventh
Anderson

District

presiding

Court

with the

(Transcript

denied, although trial court

Honorable

1-73).

Said

Lyle

motion

R.
was

found that trooper Eldredge

did not have reasonable suspicion for continued detention
and

exceeded

scope

questioning

about

search

3aid

and

of

contraband
consent

illegality and therefore
ruled

that

traffic

before

any

expectation of priuacy

stop

and

detaining

requesting

was not
invalid

by

and

consent

to

attenuated

from

that

(R. 81-84).

But

Court

illegality
in the rest

Pierce

narrowed

his

of the vehicle

and

specifically the marijuana in the trunk by his statement
that the only thing that was his was the backpack and that
he said that intending to make the officer believe that the

3

DacKpacK was oniy m i n g in m e venicie m a i uias nis u .
72 ; R. 81-84).

n-

Judge Anderson found that statement to be

an abandonment of expectation of privacy and

that

it mas

reasonable for the officer to rely on that abandonment (T.
73; R. 84).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and

Order Denying Hot ion to Suppress were filed on August 16,
1994 (R. 80-84).
Pursuant to State v, Serif and Rule 11(i), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Pierce entered a conditional guilty
plea, reserving his right

to appeal

the denial

of

his

motion to suppress, (T. 74-94) to Possession of Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute and Failure to Comply
with the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax (T. 87-88).

Pierce entered

a straight guilty plea to Speeding (T. 8 8 ) .

Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order re Conditional Plea
were entered on October 11, 1994 (R. 85-86).
On October 20, 1994, Pierce was sentenced to serve

a

term not to exceed five years in prison and pay fees and
fines

in the amount

of $1,850,00;

the prison

term

was

suspended on condition he serve 60 days in the San Juan
County Jail and pay the
November

28,

1994,

fees and

Pierce

fines (R. 87-88).

filed

an

Application

On
for

Certificate of Probable Cause with Memorandum

in Support

arguing

substantial

questions

that

the

issues

of

law

and

on

fact

appeal
which

raised

are

novel

or

fairly

debatable and integral to the dispositive ruling (R. 8997).

On the December 5, 1994, the Certificate of Probable

4

Cause,

staying

the

judgment

pending

th i s

appeal,,

was

entered by the trial court (R. 100-101).
D.

Facts

On

February

17,

1994,

Trooper

Rick

El dredge

(Eldredge), working in San Juan County, Utah on State Road
191, observed and stopped a vehicle for speeding (T. 6-7).
The driuer, identified as defendant Daryl Pierce (Pierce)
was the sole occupant of the vehicle (T. 7 ) .

Eldredge

informed Pierce that he was stopped because of his speed;
Pierce acknowledged going a little fast (T. 7, 32). Pierce
produced his driver's license and a traveler's agreement
from an auto drive-away company (T. 7, 9 ) . The agreement
Ii3ted Pierce as the authorized traveler (driuer) of the
vehicle, however, Eldredge initially "skimmed over it" (T.
9, 21-22).

The agreement stated Pierce's route and that he

was authorized to travel on Interstate 70 and local roads
as needed (T.22, 28, 36). It also stated the driver wa3 to
call owner the day before delivery to make appropriate
delivery

arrangements

(T. 36-37).

The agreement

also

listed the UIN number of the vehicle which matched the
vehicle stopped by Eldredge

(T. 22). During this first

portion of the stop, Eldredge observed luggage and golf
clubs in the back seat and asked Pierce whose belongings
were in the back seat

(T. 7-8).

Pierce replied that

luggage and golf clubs were the owner's and the only thing
that was his was the backpack (T. 8 ) .

5

El dredge also asked Pierce where he was going (T. 7 ) .
There is a dispute about what the officer was told about
Pierce's travel plans: Eldredge alleges that Pierce stated
one reason for travel and then contradicted himself while
Pierce testified he did not give conflicting stories (T. 7,
10, 32-33).

Pierce knew the vehicle owner's name, but

stated that he was told to take the vehicle to someone else
and did not have that name handy (T. 9, 33). Eldredge felt
that the story was peculiar, the travel route wa3 strange
and Pierce was nervous (T. 10-11).
Eldredge and Pierce then went back to his patrol
vehicle

for

the

issuance

of

a speeding

investigative questioning (T. 11-12, 26).

citation

and

While in the

process of writing the citation, as Eldredge was suspicious
about Pierce (although suspicions did not rise to the level
of reasonable suspicion (T. 6?)) he asked Pierce if he had
any weapons or controlled substances in the vehicle and he
replied no (T. 11-12). The uncompleted ticket, along with
Pierce's

license and paperwork, was put aside and not

completed until Pierce was booked at the county jail (T.
12, 16, 19, 25). Pierce

was asked to consent to a vehicle

search, told he had to sign form before Eldredge could
search and he then signed a consent form (T.12-15).
Eldredge began a search of the vehicle, in the front
passenger side of the car and worked his way to the back
seat; no contraband was found in the passenger area (T.
16).

He then popped the trunk and found more luggage,

6

including two closed duffel bag3 (T, 16), He opened one of
the duffel bags and found what appeared to him to be and
was later confirmed as a controlled substance (T. 16). He
asked what it contained and Pierce answered marijuana (T.
17). Pierce later stated that the luggage was the owner's
and the marijuana was his (T. 17). Pierce was placed under
arrest

for possession

of controlled

intent to distribute and booked into

substance

with

the

the San Juan County

Jail (T. 17).
SUMMRRV DF RRGUflEHT
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Pierce, the
lawful possessor of the vehicle, waived his standing

to

contest the seizure of the marijuana found in the vehicle's
trunk as the
lawful

user

result
of

the

of his

illegal

vehicle,

detention.

Pierce

had

"a

Rs the

reasonable

expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents and"
had

"standing

to

challenge

the

seized" during an unlawful search.

admission

of

evidence

State v. tlatison. 875

P.2d 584, 239 Utah Rdv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah flpp. 1994).
The trial court erred in ruling that Pierce abandoned
any expectation of privacy in the marijuana in the trunk by
his statement

that the only thing that was his was the

backpack despite the fact that the statement was made in
response to a question about the contents of the back seat
and he acknowledged

possession

scene.

7

of the marijuana

at

the

Pierce's statement did not constitute a waiver of his
privacy interest in the vehicle and it3 contents; even a
disclaimer

of

interest

is

insufficient

to

establish

abandonment. The trial court erred in using the officer's
state of mind rather than the defendant's in determining
abandonment and not looking objectively at the words used
and the factual situation.
not

requiring

the

The trial judge also erred in

prosecutor

to

meet

his

burden

establishing abandonment which must be shown by
unequivocal and decisive evidence".
P.2d 730, 736 (Utah flpp. 1991, rev'd
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992).

of

"clear,

State v. Rome. 806
on other grounds);

850

Standing and expectation of privacy

conclusions are reviewed under a correctness standard and
under that

standard

the trial

court's conclusions

were

incorrect as was his denial of the motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
There is no case law or legal authority for the trial
court'3 ruling that a statement referring to one item in
one part of a vehicle can serve as an abandonment of a
legitimate
contents.

privacy interest in the rest of the vehicle and
However, a disclaimer of interest has been held

by many courts and legal authorities to be insufficient to
constitute

abandonment.

fls

the

issue of whether

the

statement about one area can equal abandonment of the rest
of vehicle is a novel issue and what factually constitutes
abandonment is a fairly unclear area in Utah case law, the

8

most pertinent analysis, the direct

disclaimer

analysis

will be used.
I.

Standing

fls a preliminary matter, there is no question that
Pierce has standing to object to the search and seizure of
his person and that of the vehicle he lawfully possessed.
"Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
car than

in his

or

her home, one does

not

lose

the

protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile."
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989).

Utah

case I QUI is clear that "a driver who has permission to use
a vehicle and has personal belongings in the car has a
reasonable

expectation

contents."

of privacy

in the car

and

its

State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah

fipp. 1992).

fl

lawful

possessor

has

"a

reasonable

expectation of privacy In the vehicle and its contents and,
unless waived, has standing to challenge the admission of
evidence seized during the search."

State v. flatison. 875

P.2d 584; 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah App. 1994).
Whether defendant

ha3 a

legitimate

expectation

of

privacy is reviewed "under a correction of error standard,
affording

no

deference

to the trial

court."

State

v.

Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) citing State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1992).
fis authorized

possessor

of

a

vehicle

illegally

detained by an officer, Pierce has standing to contest the

9

seizure of the marijuana found in the trunk as the result
of his illegal detention.

Trial court noted "if defendant

has standing then this is going to be suppressed" because
"the illegality of detaining to ask for consent is itself
not

sufficiently

attenuative

(3ic)

from

the

voluntary

consent to make the consent valid" (T. 70-71). fls Pierce
did not

abandon

or waive his

privacy

interest

he

had

standing to object to the search and the motion to suppress
should have been granted due to his illegal detention.
Trial court correctly acknowledged the case lam giving
Pierce

an

expectation

of privacy

and standing

in the

vehicle and its contents; however he incorrectly held that
Pierce
comment.

had

decreased

that

expectation

by his

backpack

Trial court noted:

general statements in the cases that if someone
has exhibited the right to have the vehicle
and control the vehicle, he has an expectation
of privacy in the vehicle or everything in it.
find that would ordinarily apply here, but in
this case, we have the additional factor that
that mas narrowed down by the defendant's own
statements. He made a statement Intending the
officer to understand, and the officer did, in
fact, understand that the only thing in this
vehicle which belonged to someone else, which he
would have a brief period of time, was his backpack, find I find from that -- I'm looking — I
think the proper way to examine that question
from the standpoint of what the officer — I
can't expect the officer to predict what will
happen after that.

10

(T. 71).

The court erred in finding that the statement

constituted abandonment and analyzing the issue from the
officer's point of view.
2.

Abandonment.

fl statement referring to one item in one part of a
vehicle is insufficient

to establish the abandonment

of

privacy expectation in remainder of vehicle and contents,
fi mere

disclaimer

abandonment.

of

Abandonment

unambiguous facts viewed
mind.

ownership
must

does
be

not

constitute

shown

by

from the defendant's

clear,
state of

Prosecution has the burden of proving abandonment

and they failed to do so in this case.

fl. fl Mere Disclaimer of Property Interest
is Insufficient to Prove Abandonment.
Many courts and legal authorities have held that it
takes more than a denial or disclaimer

of

interest

in

questioned property to establish abandonment.
"Abandonment

must

be

distinguished

from

a

mere

disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior
to the search, which under the better view does not defeat
standing." 4 Li, LaFave, Search
287

(2d

ed.

1987).

and Seizure,

Illustrative

§ 11.3(a) at

is Commonwealth

v.

Sandler. 368 floss. 729, 335 N.E.2d

903 (1975).

questioned property owner Drew about

location which they

11

Police

believed contained stolen property. Drew referred them to
renter Sandler who
denied renting the premises or storing any
property there, after which the police searched
those premises with the consent of Drew, The
court quite correctly ruled that Sandler had
standing to question the search, for it can hardly
be said that Fourth Amendment rights evaporate
merely because of a failure to make incriminating
admissions in response to police inquiries. The
disclaimer, therefore, does not defeat defendant's
standing.
1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure,

§ 11.3(a) at 287-88 (2d

ed. 1987).
This court has also applied the "better rule" that a
mere

disclaimer

or

an

ambiguous

disclaimer

does

not

constitute abandonment. See State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730,
736 (Utah App. 1991, rev'd

an other grounds) \ 850 P.2d 427

(Utah 1992) (The Supreme Court held that the search warrant
violation

did

not

require

exclusion

of

evidence

and

therefore did not address the Court of Appeals ruling on
abandonment); 3ee also State v. Marshal 1. 791 P.2d 880, 132
Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App.), cert,

denied,

800 P.2d 1105

(Utah 1990).
Rowe involved an invited guest at a home where a noknock nighttime search warrant

was executed.

Officers

secured the house and gave her permission to leave but
since she was not wearing shoes an officer accompanied her

12

to the bedroom where she retrieved them from a pile of
items.

State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730, 731.

The officer then asked her if she had everything that
was hers and she replied that she did.
was searched and drugs were found.
was found

She left, the house

Specifically, a purse

in the bedroom pile that contained a vial of

methamphetamine and documents belonging to Rowe.

Later at

the police department she admitted ownership of the drugs
and purse.

The state argued that

Rowe

abandoned

any

expectation of privacy when she told the officer she had
everything that was hers. State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d at 732.
In deciding whether Rowe had abandoned her expectation
of privacy, the court relied upon

the "better view" that a

mere disclaimer does not defeat standing. 806 P.2d at 736
citing *t U. LaFave, Search
(2d ed. 1987). The court

and Se/zare,

§ 11.3(a) at 287

found that abandonment had not

been proven by that state, but it did not determine whether
Rowe's response constituted abandonment. 806 P.2d at 737.
The court held that Rowe's "repudiation of
property

located

conclusion
inconsistent

of

in the bedroom
abandonment.

interest

is consistent
It

is

not,

with a
however,

with a conclusion of a mere disclaimer

interest to avoid self-incrimination."

in

of

806 P.2d at 736.

Rowe specifically said she had all her possessions and
she left the items under police control whereas Pierce made
a statement about one area of vehicle and never physically
abandoned the items.

Using the above analysis, Pierce

13

should

be

found

to

not

have

abandoned

his

privacy

expectation in the trunk contents.
Marshall

involved

a traffic

stop

inhere Marshal I's

rental car trunk was opened, he mas asked what was in the
suitcase found there, initially replied "clothes" and then
said "the suitcases were not his and must have already been
in the trunk when he rented

the

vehicle".

State

v.

Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah fidv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah
flpp.) cert,

denied,

characterized

800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).

the

above

disclaimer of ownership".
fidv. Rep. at 50.

statement

as

The court

an

"ambiguous

Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah

The case was remanded for determination

of whether defendant had abandoned his privacy interest and
the

nexus

between

the

police

illegality

and

his

abandonment, if any, of expectation of privacy.
The Marshal!
abandonment

was

court cited several federal cases where
found

when

defendant

specifically

physically or verbally abandoned or disclaimed the actual
item seized, i.e., defendant

initially seen with an item

and when stopped didn't have item and denied knowledge of
it; defendant denied ownership of item located next to him;
or defendant disclaimed ownership of the item and walked
away.

Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah fidv. Rep.at 52, n.

11 (citations omitted).
Marshall's

disclaimer

situations that generally

Given the characterization
as

ambiguous

and

the

of

factual

constitute abandonment, Pierce's

statement clearly does not constitute an abandonment as it
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is ambiguous and not a direct specific denial of ownership.
Pierce's backpack statement i3 much more akin to a mere
disclaimer than an unambiguous abandonment.
Pierce's failure to volunteer information about the
presence of controlled substance before it mas discovered
(answering

in

negative

when

first

questioned

about

contraband) is a patent example of a permissible exercise
of

his

right

to

avoid

self-incrimination

Like

ambiguous disclaimer, a failure to make an

an

inculpatory

statement is insufficient to show abandonment. "To equate a
passive failure to claim potentially incriminating evidence
with an affirmative abandonment of property mould be to
twist both

logic and experience

in a most

uncomfortable

knot." State v. Jouner. 66 Hawaii 543, 669 P.2d 152 (1983).
See /sas,

infra,

for further Fifth Amendment analysis.

In State v. Isom. the tlontana Supreme Court found that
despite a state statute that a search could not be held
illegal if defendant disclaimed interest in place or object
searched

or things

seized and

ownership of the vehicle by

a despite

Isom, he had

a

denial

of

standing

to

contest search of bags containing marijuana in the trunk of
the car. 196 ttont. 330, 641 P.2d 417, 422 (1982). Court
held

that

a mere

disclaimer

should

not

give

abandonment.
Given the position that a defendant does
not otherwise have to incriminate himself to
preserve his Fourth Amendment rights, . . .
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rise

to

it is difficult to understand how a refusal to
make incriminating admissions in response to
police interrogation can be held to deprive a
person of Fourth Amendment standing.
Isorn. 641 P,2d at 422, citing Simmons v, United States
(1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d
court using a Rwanda

1247. The

or Fifth Amendment analysis, stated

that "(c)learly, the Riranda

I imitations should apply to

disclaimers when the State U3es them to deprive a person of
Fourth Amendment standing." Isorn. 641 P.2d 422.
The

Court

expectation

then

looked

at

defendant's

privacy

in the specific area searched and held that

regardless of the Fifth Amendment limitations on the state
statute and even
assuming that the disclaimer could be construed
to deprive the defendant of standing to contest
the search of the car, In light of Robblns v.
California (1981), 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841,
69 L.Ed.2d 744, the disclaimer could not be construed to deprive the defendant of standing to
contest the search of the garbage bags found in
the trunk of the car.
In Rabbin^Wte Court held that while police
may have conducted a lawful search of an automobile under the automobile exception, they must
nevertheless secure a warrant for any container
found in the trunk of the car. The Court recognized that the expectation of privacy in a closed
container taken from a car is not necessarily less
than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of
luggage found elsewhere.
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said that the defendant lost his expectation of
privacy in the opaque garbage bags when he disclaimed ownership of the car. While it is arguable that the disclaimer weakened the defendant's
expectation of privacy In the car, it cannot be
said to have affected his expectation of privacy
in the garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore,
in no way affected defendant's standing to contest
the search of the garbage bags,
641 P,2d at 422-23,
The Fifth Amendment

analysis clearly applies to the

answers to questioning about contraband as Pierce at that
time mas clearly not free to go, however it should also
apply to the backpack comment as at that time Pierce was
also not

iree

to go, as officer had not given him a

citat ion yet,
HI so the closed container analysis is applicable in
this case and Pierce should be found to have standing to
contest

the

search

containing marijuana,

of

the

duffel

bag

in the

trunk

Pierce's case is even clearer as he

never made a denial of knowledge about the vehicle as Isom
did, in fact, he never made any denial of possession of the
vehicle or any contents except the owner's luggage.
In State v. Huether. the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that a post
abandonment.

search disclaimer did

453 N,U.2d

778

(H.D.

not

1990).

constitute

Huether

was

stopped for speeding, officer detected alcohol, obtained
consent to search for open containers, and opened a small
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bag partially
contained
contain

under the front seat.

garbage, however
controlled

Huether

it ma3 opened and

substance

and

Huether

3aid

it

found

to

then

denied

ownership and knowledge of bag and contents. 153 N.U.2d at
780.
The state argued, as the state and court reasoned in
the present case, that by saying "'the bag wasn't his and
he didn't know what was inside,' he lost any expectation of
privacy in the bag." 453 H.U.2d at 780.

The trial court

ruled that Huether's denial of ownership, by itself, was
not a waiver of Huether's reasonable expectation of privacy
in the bag. id

The Horth Dakota Supreme Court noted that

an examination of how defendant

treated the article

needed, as a disclaimer:
is "not necessarily the hallmark for deciding
the substance of a fourth amendment claim."
In the same way that ownership alone may not
be sufficient to confer or retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy, . . . disavowal of
ownership alone may not be enough to relinquish
one's reasonable expectation of privacy. This
is especially true where, as here, the paper
bag is contained and controlled within an areo
where there is a legitimate expectation of
privacy. Huether did not discard or place the
bag in a pub Iic place.
453 H.N.2d at 781 (citations omitted).
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is

After reviewing the location from which the container
with the contraband was seized and the container

itself,

the court held:
There Is little doubt that Huether had
an expectation of privacy in his vehicle and
in every container therein that concealed its
contents from plain view, There is no constitutional distinction between paper bags and
others kinds of containers. Furthermore, where
the disclaimer comes only after the search of
the disclaimed article reveals contraband, the
disclaimer, made In an effort to avoid making
an incriminating statement, should not alone
be deemed to constitute abandonment.
Id. at 781 (citations omitted).
Similarly,

Pierce should be determined

to have an

expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the containers
(duffel bags) whose contents were not in plain view.
bag was also

in an vehicle where he had a

expectation of privacy.

His

legitimate

His statements also should

be

found to be insufficient to establish abandonment.
fl statement alone is not determinative; court should
look objectively at situation and what actually was said
and done. In a similar fact situation to the present case:
accused narcotics offenders were held not to
have abandoned a bag containing heroin which
was found In the car they had been driving,
even though they had denied ownership of the
bag when approached and questioned by police
in People v. Cameron (1973) 73 nisc.2d 790, 342
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HYS2d 773, where the court pointed out that the
accused had not denied possession of the bag
and ruled that mere denial of ownership mas not
proof of an intent to abandon, The bag had not
been thrown from the car, the court observed,
but had remained under the seat while the accused were stopped and questioned by the police.
There is a great deal of difference, the court
stated, between denial of ownership of property
on a public street where no possession is
claimed or indicated and denial of ownership of
property in a car where possession is conceded.
40flLR4th Search and Seizure—Abandoned Property % 22 In

Uehicle at 431-35.

B~Under a Factual Analysis Pierce Had No Intent
To Relinquish His Expectation of Privacy
"Abandonment is primarily a factual question of intent
to

voluntarily

relinquish

a reasonable

expectation of

privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken, acts
done, and other objective facts'."
(citation

omitted).

"Abandonment

Rome. 806 P.2d at 736
'is measured

vantage point' of the defendant, not the police.

from the
'It is

only the [defendant's] state of mind that counts.'" 806
P.2d

at 736 (citation

omitted).

"Ue determine

whether

defendants have an expectation of privacy from their point
of view. . . . [U]e look to how defendants manifest their
expectations regarding the object

searched

to determine

their subjective privacy interest." State v. Kol3ter. 869
P.2d 993 (Utah App. 1994).
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The words used by both Pierce and El dredge show no
intent

to abandon

or

understanding

of

abandonment

of

Pierce'3 expectation of privacy in the trunk contents. The
officer
about

acknowledged
the

contents

he questioned

Pierce

of

seat

the

back

specifically
(T.

8,

23).

Objectively a reasonable individual questioned about the
back seat mould answer about the back seat only as Pierce
answered.

Looking at the "words spoken", Pierce did not

say "the only thing in the entire car that is mine is the
backpack" or "the only thing in the car that is mine is the
backpack", rather referring to the contents of back seat he
3aid "those are the owner's, only thing that is mine is the
backpack" (T. 8 ) .
Also at the scene before the packages of marijuana
were opened, Pierce admitted the bags contained marijuana
and soon thereafter admitted
Pierce's

actions

are

it belonged to him (T. 17).

inconsistent

with

an

intent

to

abandon.
It is important to note Eldredge did not treat the
backpack

statement

as

an abandonment

interest in the rest of the vehicle.
or believed

is part of

our

of

any

priuacy

"Uhat an officer knew

legitimate expectation

of

privacy analysis only when a defendant has asserted to that
officer a permissive or possessory interest in the object
searched."

Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995.

That standard is

applicable in the present situation.

After the backpack

comment,

further

Eldredge

questioned
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Pierce

about

the

vehicle's contents and requested

consent

to search the

vehicle (T. 12-15). fls the vehicle uia3 owned by another
individual, if officer felt Pierce had no other items in
the vehicle then, he should have tried to contact the omner
to obtain permission to search.

Obviously, a person mho

has abandoned any interest in the vehicle and its contents
is not the appropriate

person to ask to consent

to a

search, in fact abandoned property does not require consent
to search.
Based on El dredge's request for consent he obviously
did not treat the backpack comment as an abandonment of
Pierce's further interest in the vehicle and its contents.
El dredge acted as if Pierce had privacy

interest. fin

officer's similar reaction has been held to defeat a claim
of abandonment:
[Gjarment bag illegally seized from defendant's railroad sleeping car was not abandoned,
even though defendant, when questioned by
federal agents as to ownership, replied "Uell,
it's yours now," where agents gave defendant
receipt for it, and waited for dog sniff to
establish probable cause instead of treating it
as abandoned property and opening it right away.
United States v. Diraick (1992, DC Colo) 790
F.Supp. 1543.
40fiLR4th, Search andSeizure—Abandoned Proper>tt/t § 22.5

Conveyances other than cars or trucks, supp. at 36.
That the "abandonment" in the case at bar was not
based on the requisite clear, unequivocal decisive evidence
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was acknowledged by the trial court when asked

by defense

counsel about factual issues that indicated there was no
abandonment.
Miss Starley: On the standing Issue, the
officer testified that he questioned him about
what mas in the back seat, and that's when he
made the statement that only the backpack was
his, and that when he was asked about the marijuana, he did say that was his. That was what
was presented to the officer at that time.
The Court: I'm aware of that, Hiss
Starley, and I realize that that nay undercut
the conclusion that I arrived at here, But,
I'm basing my conclusion on the fact that this
is a situation where the defendant, from the
very beginning, distanced himself from this
vehicle as having any responsibility for what
was in it. find, with regard to the only things
that were apparent in it, he said, "the only
thing that is mine is the backpack," Now, I
realize that could have been interpreted 08
meaning the only thing that's in the back seat
is my backpack. But, I find that what the defendant intended to convey was the only things
in the car that's mine is the backpack, and
everything else in the car is the owner's, find,
I agree that there's some ambiguity there in
regard to what's in the trunk, because that was
not specifically visible. But, I find specifically that the defendant did say, "The only thing
that's mine is the backpack," He didn't say,
"The only thing in the back seat that's mine is
the backpack," He said, "The only thing that's
mine is the backpack", meaning and understood to
be the only thing in the car.
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(T. 72-73).
The trial court's conclusion that Pierce had distanced
himself from the vehicle is not supported by the objective
facts: he showed El dredge proof that he mas the lawful
possessor, answered questions about its contents, signed a
consent to search and claimed the marijuana found therein.
Given his possession through a drive-away agreement he had
many opportunities to distance himself but he did not do
so. Again, he could have said "that backpack is only thing
in this car that's mine" or "I don't know about anything in
the car except my backpack" or when questioned about
consent "Don't ask me, nothing in the car is mine". Also
as noted above, the trial court's ruling that Eldredge
understood Pierce to have abandoned his privacy interest is
not supported by the objective facts, in particular,
Eldredge did not treat the property as abandoned, instead
he asked for consent and even told Pierce that he could
not search unless Pierce signed the consent form (T. 1215).
Obviously Pierce's statement about the back seat
contents is nothing like the standard abandonment situation
where item is physically discarded, see Marshall discussion
supra, and Rust In discussion Infra
"One of the most
common situations in which abandonment is claimed by the
prosecution, and often sustained by the courts, is where an
accused criminal had allegedly dropped, thrown away, or
otherwise discarded some incriminating item, such as
24

narcotics, during an encounter with the police or other law
enforcement

agents." 40 flLR 4th,

Abandoned Property

Search

Seizure—

§ 2 Summary and Comment at 389.

In State v. Austin. Utah Supreme
Austin

and

lost his expectation

of privacy

court
in

held
items

that
found

partially burned in a wastebasket as items mere in plain
view and
a privacy expectation is based on a subjective
intent that the person has an Interest in the
property. Once that property Is thrown away,
however, no valid interest remains, fl wastebasket carries an inference that anything put
into it is intended to be discarded or destroyed. It i3 not the same privacy interest that
exists in a drawer or in a foot locker as was
found in the Chadtnick case•"
Rust In. 584 P.2d 853, 857 (Utah 1978). Chadxick dealt with
warrantless searches during arrests and "held that evidence
should be suppressed because it was taken from a foot locker
in which the defendant had a privacy interest". 584 P.2d at
655, citing U.S. v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53
L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
The present case involves a closed container, whose
contents were hidden from view, in the trunk of car, an
area where Pierce had and kept a privacy interest, like the
foot locker
ftustin.

in

Chadwick

rather

than

the wastebasket

in

The lawful possessor of vehicle has an expectation

of privacy in all closed

containers in the vehicle which

is recognized as reasonable by society, be it a paperbag as
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in ttuatner,

garbage bag in /acta, foot locker in Cbadxr/ck or

a bag in Carnation.
privacy

Pierce maintained his expectation of

a3 did defendants

Cameron, the bag 3tayed

in those

cases. Here

as in

in the car, concealed from view

while defendant was stopped and questioned. It i3 important
to note: "[t]here is a great deal of difference, between
denial of ownership of property on a public street where no
possession is claimed or indicated and denial of ownership
of property in a car where possession is conceded.
4th,

Search and Seizure—Abandoned Property

Uehicle at 434-35 citing

40 flLR

§ 22 In

Caaeran.

C — T h e State Failed to Prove Abandonment
"The burden of proving abandonment falls on the state,
and must

be shown by 'clear, unequivocal

evidence'."

and decisive

Rowe. 806 P.2d at 736 (citations omitted).

The 3tate has not met their burden as they are relying
solely on an ambiguous, equivocal statement as the trial
court acknowledged supra

R statement about one area and

one item not the entire vehicle contents, fl statement made
in

a context

which

showed

an intent

to maintain an

expectation of privacy.
In reviewing all available legal sources, there were
no cases found where a statement claiming ownership of one
item in a vehicle was held to be a disclaimer of interest
in the rest of the vehicle and its contents.

However given

the number of cases where a direct denial of ownership in
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the specific container in question or area enclosing the
container ha3 been held to not establish abandonment, it is
difficult to see how Pierce's statement could do so,
fl3 3een from the examination of the relevant case law,
it takes a very unambiguous disclaimer to support a claim
of abandonment:

Marshall's

initial

statement

that

the

suitcases had clothes and his subsequent statements that
the cases were not his and must
vehicle

were

categorized

an

have already

"ambiguous

ownership". 132 Utah fldv. Rep. 45, 50.
that she had removed everything

been

in

disclaimer

of

Rowe's statement

from the room and her

leaving her purse in the house with police was held to be
insufficient to meet state's burden of proof to establish
abandonment.

806 P.2d 730,736-37. Huether's disclaimer of

ownership of bag in car was held insufficient as mas l3om's
denial of ownership of car where contraband was found.

611

P.2d 417, 422-23.
fls noted supra,
involved

shows

Pierce's comment
Eldredge.

an objective analysis of the facts

that

abandonment

wa3

not

intended

by

and was not treated as abandonment by

Pierce's statement is not sufficient to show an

intent to abandon the expectation of privacy in the vehicle
and its contents he had as the lawful possessor of the
vehicle.
Pierce was only answering the question asked which
referred
Officer

to

the contents

acknowledged

of

the back seat

the question
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was

(T. 7-8).

in reference

to

contents of the back seat (T. 8, 23). There is no showing
that he intended to disclaim ownership of the rest of the
contents of the vehicle, flfter the backpack statement,the
officer asked Pierce to consent to a search and he signed a
consent form (T. 12-15).

Even using the trial

court's

flawed analysis of the officer's state of mind at the
scene,

Eldredge

treated

Pierce

as having

a

privacy

interest by requesting consent and not treating the rest of
the uehicle and contents as abandoned or belonging
another.

to

He even told Pierce hat he could not search

without Pierce's consent (T. 12-15).
More

importantly,

Pierce

continued

to

express

a

privacy interest by signing the form and while he did not
claim knowledge of contraband in general when first asked
(a mere disclaimer to avoid self-incrimination) he did not
say none of its mine or you'll have to contact the owner.
Again., he also claimed ownership of the marijuana at the
scene, as opposed to the usual situation where the suspect
denies any knowledge at the scene and only claims ownership
to prove standing at the suppression hearing.
Under the proper abandonment analysis, there

is no

showing that Pierce intended to abandon his expectation of
privacy in the trunk contents.
meet its burden of proof.
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The state has failed to

D. Abandonment is Reviewed Under
Correctness Standard.
Judge's

finderson

legal

conclusion

that

Pierce

abandoned his expectation of privacy is reviewed "under a
'correctness* standard."

State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913,

914 (Utah flpp. 1992), citing State v. Looez. 831 P.2d 1040,
1043 (Utah flpp. 1992),

Standing

is reviewed

correctness standard, fls noted in Sepulvedat

under

a

"me review

the trial court's conclusion as to whether defendant had a
legitimate

expectation

of privacy

under a

correctness

standard, affording no deference." 842 P.2d at 914.
"Utah case lam teaches that 'correctness' means 'the
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
lam.' Thus, the broadest scope of judicial review extends
to questions of law."

Judge Norman

H. Jackson,

Utah

Standards of tippet late tie<//enr, Utah Bar Journal, October

1994, at 21, quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994) and State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
Under the correctness standard the denial of Pierce's
motion to suppress should be reversed.

From the analysis

of the relevant case law and legal authorities, it is clear
under the property abandonment inquiry that Pierce did not
abandon his expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its
contents, specifically in the marijuana in a duffel bag in
the trunk.

Looking at the objective facts, words spoken,
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acts done ana n e r c e s intent, tnere is not suuicieru
support for the abandonment conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Pierce

as the

lawful

expectation of privacy

possessor

had

legitimate

in the vehicle and its contents

which he maintained throughout his illegal detention and
therefore the evidence improperly seized should have been
suppressed.
For the reasons stated above, the order denying the
motion to suppress should be reversed and the case remanded
for dismissal of charges.
Respectfully submitted this C S £ l _ day of April, 1995.

Sandra U. Star ley'
Attorney for Defendant
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of the the foregoing brief of appellant to:
Utah Attorney General
Appellate Division
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 M
L

Attorney for Oefejraant
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ntftfuitfvit
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-46.
Speed
R e g u l a t i o n s — S a f e and Appropriate Speeds at Certain
Locations—Priia
Facie
Speed
Limits—Emergency
Power of Governor.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the
following speeds ore lawful:
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed
in excess of the limits provided in Subsection (2) is
prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or
prudent and that it is unlawful.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(2) Prohibited acts B ~ Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance, unless
it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order , , . or as otherwise authorized by this
subsection.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-19-103
(1) H tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled
substances as defined under this chapter at the following
rates:
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a
gram, $3.50.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6.
R i ght s o f de fendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases.

a

Court of Appeal8 jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases
except those involving a conviction of a first degree
or capital felony.
Rule 11(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally III, or no contest, reserving
in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to
a review of the adverse determination of any specified
pre-trial motion, fl defendant who prevails on appeal
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(2) fin appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
Ca) the final judgment of conviction, whether by
verdict or plea.
Rule 3. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rppeal as of right: hot taken.
(a) Filing appeal froi final orders and judgments.
fin appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is
ground only for such action a3 the appellate court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award
of attorney fees.
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STATE v HUETHER
C U * M 4 S 3 N.WJd 77S (N.D

*rtained from the writing
Sections 9-07-02, 9-07nc Construction, Inc v
iperties, 344 N W 2d 679
w ords of a contract are to
their ordinary and popular
. are used in a technical
n a special meaning Sec
DCC

Rule 52(a), N D R Civ P National Bank
of Harvey v International Harvester Co
supra, Graber v Engstrom, 384 N W 2d
307 (N D 1986) A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when, although there is some
evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was
made Id.

New World Dictionary,
Edition, defines "pet" as
is tamed or domesticated
»mpanion or treated with
>rdinary and popular defiius not necessarily limited
It is not clear from the
er public nuisance" is uv
and give a special meano refer to some other use
that might be a public
igh the term public nuiid to apply to horses and
• may be read to prevent
property that might be
a pubbc nuisance Moreion of the city ordinance
as argued by Schuch,
atency because the ordijrses and the agreement
o horses Extrinsic evh
u> explain that inconsistjaion of the ordinance as
Tient requires the consid>ic evidence beyond the
he agreement in order to
nship of the ordinance to
That reliance on extrinsic

[4] In this case the trial court heard
conflicting evidence on the intent of the
parties and resolved that conflict in favor
of Heupel and against Schuch the party
who prepared the agreement Section 907-19, N D C C , Graber v Engstrom, su
pro. We are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that the trial court made a
mistake in resolving the conflicting evi
dence Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court's findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous

an indication of an ambining of paragraph 10 is
face of the agreement,
that rational arguments
afferent interpretations of
We therefore agree with
t paragraph 10 is ambigugTeement of the parties
e of the property for am-ract is ambiguous extnnmisaible to determine the
rtiea, and a trial court's
that intent from extrinsic
eation of fact subject to

The judgment is affirmed
ERICKSTAD, C J , and LEVINE,
MESCHKE and GIERKE, JJ , concur
«St$TtM>
[o Iitmtmiti

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
David L. HUETHER, Defendant
and Appellee
Cr. No. 890261.
Supreme Court of North Dakota
March 27, 1990
State appealed from order of the D«*
tnct Court, Grant County, South Central
Judicial District Gerald G Glaser J suppressing evidence obtained in warrantless
search of defendant's pickup truck The
Supreme Court, Levine J, held that 0>
defendant did not abandon paper bag con

taming controlled substance, (2) police officer who received defendant's consent to
search defendant's vehicle for open alcohol
ic beverage containers exceeded scope of
consent when he opened brown paper bag
that was partly under front seat of vehicle,
and (3) officer did not have probable cause
to believe that paper bag contained alcoholic beverage container
Affirmed
1. Criminal Law *»U58(4)
Trial court's disposition on motion to
suppress will not be reversed if, after conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of
affirmance, there is sufficient competent
evidence fairly capable of supporting trial
court's determination
2. Drugs and Narcotics «=»185.10
Defendant who consented to police of
fleer's search of his vehicle for open alcoholic beverage containers did not abandon
paper bag containing controlled substance
when he told officer that "the bag wasn't
his and he didn't know what was inside of
it," where statement was made after contraband was uncovered U S C A Const
Amend 4
I. Searches and Seizures *=»28
Warrantless search or seizure of property that has been abandoned does not
violate Fourth Amendment
USCA.
Const Amend 4.
4. Searches and Seizures ^ 2 8
"Abandonment," in Fourth Amend
ment sense, is primarily question of intent
which may be inferred from words, acts or
other objective facts, abandonment implies
renunciation of any reasonable expectation
of privacy and is question of fact US.
C A Const Amend 4
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5 Searches and Seizures «=»28
If person alleged to have abandoned
property intends to retain his or her pnva
cy interests in that property, there has
been no abandonment U S C A Const
Amend 4
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6. Criminal Law
1158(1)
Because resolution of whether place or
object has been abandoned depends upon
factual inquiry ultimate determination is
reviewed under clearlj erroneous standard
U S C A Const Amend 4
7 Searches and Seizures *=»65
There is no constitutional distinction
between paper bags and other kinds of
containers found in vehicle
USCA
Const Amend 4
8 Searches and Seizures «=»28
Where disclaimer of ownership comes
only after search of disclaimed article reveals contraband disclaimer, made in effort to avoid making incriminating statement should not alone be deemed to constitute abandonment U S C A ConstAmend
4
9. Searches and Seizures «=»201
Question of whether search exceeds
scope of consent is factual one, and thus
subject to clearly erroneous standard of
review U S C A ConstAmend 4
10 Searches and Seizures *=>171. 186
Consent search is exception to both
warrant and probable cause requirements
of Fourth Amendment, and must be conducted according to limitations placed upon
police officer's right to search by consent
or search loses its validity
USCA
Const Amend 4
11. Searches and Seizures *»186
Police officer who received defendant's
consent to search defendant's vehicle for
open alcoholic beverage containers exceeded scope of consent when he opened brown
paper bag that was partly under front seat
of vehicle, where bag had neither weight
nor shape of alcoholic beverage container
U S C A Const Amend 4
12. Automobiles *=»349 5(5)
Police officer who conducted search of
defendant's vehicle for open alcoholic beverage containers did not have probable
cause to believe that paper bag that was
partially under front seat contained such a
container bag was pushed partly under
front seat in such manner as to give officer
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no reason to believe it contained a bottle or
can USC A Const Amend 4
13 Criminal Law •=1158(4)
Trial court at suppression hearing is in
superior position to judge credibility of wit
nesaes and weight to be accorded their
testimony, conflicts in testimony must be
resolved in favor of affirming trial court
Phyllis Ann Ratchffe State's Atty , Car
son, for plaintiff and appellant
Vime Law Firm Bismarck, for defendant
and appellee argued by Ralph A Vmje
LEVINE Justice
The State appeals from an order suppressing evidence obtained in a warrantless
search of David Huether's pickup truck
We affirm
R»ck Michels a state highway patrol offi
cer, stopped Huether for speeding Mi
chels detected the odor of alcohol on
Huether's breath and asked if he had been
dnnkmg Huether admitted to drinking
and volunteered that there was an unopen
ed six-pack of beer in his truck Michels
suspected an open container and obtained
Huether's consent to search the truck for
open containers
The officer opened the driver's door to
Huether's truck and saw on the floor by
the passenger seat a paper sack containing
what he believed to be a six pack of beer
However, he did not open this bag In
stead he directed his attention to a small
paper bag pushed partly under the front
seat Huether told the officer that bag
contained only garbage
The officer pulled the bag from under
the seat and opened it It contained thirty
three packets later determined to contain
amphetamine hydrochloride, a controlled
substance Huether denied both ownership
1

Although "standing" in its traditional form is
no longer part of fourth amendment analysis
the term continues to be used as convenient
shorthand for the concept of "legitimate expec
tation of privacy" See Rakas v Illinois 439
MS 128 139 99 SCt 421 428 58 LEd 2d 387
(1978) In Rakas the Supreme Court "discard
ed reliance on concepts of standing in deter

of the bag and knowledge of its contents
He was then arrested and charged with
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of NDCC
$ 19-03 1~23<1 Kb)
Huether moved to suppress the evidence
of controlled substance The district court
granted the motion to suppress, finding
that the search of the paper bag exceeded
the scope of Huether's consent, was not
supported by probable cause and that
Huether had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle The State appealed,
challenging these determinations
(1) The trial court's disposition on a
motion to suppress will not be reversed if,
after conflicts in the testimony are resolved
in favor of affirmance there is sufficient
competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's determination
State v Lorenzen, 401 N W 2d 508, 608
(N D 1987) With that standard in mind,
we consider the State's arguments for reversal
12] The State first argues that Huether
does not have "standing" * to contest the
search of the paper bag because he aban
doned the paper bag and therefore relinquished any legitimate expectation of privacy in it The State does not dispute
Huether's ownership, occupation or control
of the vehicle in which the paper bag was
found, his possession of the paper bag at
the time of the search or his control over it
Instead the State argues that when Hueth
er stated to the police officer, after the
contraband was uncovered, that "the bag
wasn't his and he didn t know what was
inside of it" he lost any expectation of
privacy in the bag
f3-6] A warrantless search or seizure
of property that has been abandoned does
not violate the fourth amendment United
States v Thomas, 864 F 2d 843 (D C Cir
mining whether a defendant is entitled to claim
the protections of the exclusionary rule The
inquiry after Rakas is simply whether the de
fendant s rights were violated by the allegedly
illegal search or seizure " United States v Sal
vuccx 448 U.S 83 87 n 4 100 SCt 2547 2551
n 4 65 L Ed 2d 619 (1980)
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1989) Abandonment, in the fourth amend
ment sense is primarily a question of in
tent which may be inferred from words
acts and other objective facts
United
States v Bumette, 698 F 2d 1038 (9th
Cir) cert denied, 461 U S 936 103 S Ct
2106 77 LEd 2d 312 (1983) Abandonment
implies a renunciation of any reasonable
expectation of privacy and is a question of
fact United States v Alden 576 F 2d 772
(8th Cir) cert denied, 439 US 855 99
SCt 167 58 LEd 2d 161 (1978) If the
person alleged to have abandoned property
intends to retain his or her privacy interest
in that property, there has been no aban
donment United States v Burnette su
pro. Because resolution of whether a
place or object has been abandoned depends upon a factual inquiry, the ultimate
determination is reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard
United States v
Thomas supra
The State points to Huether s denial of
ownership as conclusive evidence of aban
donment However, the trial court appar
ently determined that Huether's disavowal
of ownership of the paper bag standing
alone was not a renunciation of Huether s
reasonable expectation of pnvacy in the
bag

(N D

IWWI

the inquiry
417 NW 2d at 840 But cf
State i htodt 2W N W 2d 783 (N D 1980)
(upholding search on baRis of plain view
but conferring ' threshold standing' based
either on ownership or legitimate expecta
tion of pnvacy in vehicle or both ] In the
same wa> that ownership alone may not be
sufficient to confer or retain a reasonable
expectation of pnvacy eg
Benjamin,
Thoma* supra disavowal of ownership
alone ma) not be enough to relinquish
one s reasonable expectation of pnvacy
See Hawkins supra, Commonwealth v
Hollouvy 9 VaApp 11 384 S E 2d 99
(1989) This is especially true where, as
here the paper bag is contained and con
trolled *ithin an area where there is a
legitimate expectation of pnvacy See People v Cameron 73 Misc 2d 790, 342 N Y
S 2d 773 (Sup Ct 1973) Huether did not
discard or place the bag in a public place
Cf City of St Paul ? Vaughn 306 Minn
337 237 N W 2d 365 (1975) [defendant who
tucked eyeglass case under a counter at
business establishment had no reasonable
continued expectancy of pnvacy in the dis
carded property]

While a disclaimer of ownership or
knowledge may well be evidence that a
defendant does not reasonably expect the
article to be free from intrusion State v
Benjamin 417 N W 2d 838 (N D 1988)
such disclaimer is "not necessarily the hall
mark for deciding the substance of a
fourth amendment claim " United States
v Haukins 681 F 2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir)
cert denied, 459 U S 994, 103 S Ct 354 74
LEd 2d 391 (1982) As we said in State i
Benjamin "[W]hile property ownership is
a consideration, it neither begins nor ends

17,8] There is little doubt that Huether
had an expectation of pnvacy in his vehicle
and in every container therein that con
cealed its contents from plain view Unit
ed States v Ross 456 U S 798, 823, 102
SCt 2157 2172 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982)
There is no constitutional distinction be
twe«*n paper bags and other kinds of con
tamers Id Furthermore where the dis
claimer comes only after the search of the
disclaimed article reveals contraband the
disclaimer made in an effort to avoid mak
mg an incriminating statement should not
alone be deemed to constitute abandon
ment1 State v Isom, 196 Mont 330, 641

2. The State relies heavily on United States v
Veatch 674 F 2d 1217 (9th Cir 1981) to support
its contention that the evidence seized should
not have been suppressed Veatch was a passenger in a vehicle occupied by two other per
sons The vehicle was stopped and the officer
noting a gun and wallet in plain view in the
back seat where Veatch had been sitting asked
Veatch if the wallet were his and if he wanted to
take it with him Veatch denied ownership of
the wallet The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court s finding that Veatch abandoned the

wallet and any reasonable expectation of pnva
cy in il We believe the primary distinction that
renders Veatch inapposite is that Vealch was a
passenger in a vehicle and thus dtd not have any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle
Further his disclaimer of ownership preceded
the search of the wallet The abandonment was
therefore complete by the time the officer
searched the wallet leaving Veatch with no pn
vac> interest in the wallet at the time of the
search The *ame court which decided Veatch
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P2d 417 (1982), State v Machtah, 505
N E 2d 873 (Ind CtApp 1987), 4 W LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11 3(0 at 343
Under the circumstances, we find no error
in the district court's underlying determination that Huether had an expectation of
privacy m the bag thereby retaining the
protection of the fourth amendment
191 The State next argues that the
search of the paper bag was within the
scope of Huether's consent The question
whether a search exceeds the scope of consent is a factual one, United States v
Mines, 883 F 2d 801, 803 (9th Cir), cert
denied, — US
, 110 S Ct 552, 107
LEd 2d 549 (1989), and thus subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review See
State v Padgett, 393 N W 2d 754, 757
(ND1986), State v Packmeau,
423
N W 2 d 148, 151 n 1 (N D 1988)
[10] A consent search is an exception to
both the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth amendment
Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S 218,
219, 93 S Ct 2041. 2043, 3£ L Ed 2d 854
(1973), Mines, supra. See State v Gronlund, 356 N W 2d 144 (N D 1$84) It must
be conducted according to the limitations
placed upon an officer's right to search by
the consent or the search loses its validity
United States v McBean, 861 F 2d 1570
(11th Or 1988)
(111 The trial court found that "There
is some difference as to exactly what was
said, but there is no dispute that the defendant consented to the search of his vehicle
but for the limited purpose of determining
whether there was an open receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage " This finding is supported by the officer's testimony
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q I'm going to read from your preliminary hearing just briefly
'I then asked Mr
Huether if I could check his vehicle,
search—check for open containers, and
he said, yes, I could There was nothing
recognized in United States v Burnette, 698 F 2d
1038 1048 n. 19 (9ih Cir ) cert denied, 461 U S
936 103 SCl 2106 77 L Ed 2d 312 (1983) that a
mere disclaimer is usually not enough to consti
tute abandonment Generally abandonment is
found only where the disclaimer is coupled with

open in there' Is that a correct statement of what occurred7
"[OFFICER MICHELS] A I believe
so, yes
"Q So, your permission to search
was limited to searching for open containers, is that correct 7
"A That was my intent, yes "
The trial court found that the search of
the paper bag exceeded the scope of Huether's consent because, given the paper bag's
appearance and location, it could not reasonably be expected to contain the open
container for which the officer was authorized by Huether's consent to search A
more likely receptacle, but one into which
the officer did not look, was the larger
paper sack on the floor by the/ront passenger seat In this larger paper sack, the
trial court found, the officer could detect
"what was apparently a '6-pa/ik' " Yet, as
the trial court noted, the officer chose to
ignore the obvious and zero in on the much
smaller bag tucked partly under the front
seat That the smaller bag could not have
held a bottle or a can became obvious once
the officer pulled it from under the seat
Although this bag had neither the weight
nor the shape of an alcoholic beverage container the officer "decided nevertheless to
open the sack to see what was in i t " This
was impermissible under United States v
Ross, 456 US 798, 102 S C t 2157, 72
L Ed 2d 572 (1982)
Ron* involved a warrantless vehicle
search conducted pursuant to probable
cause rather than consent The Court in
Ross held that the scope of a search ts
defined by the object of the search and ts
thus limited to places in which there ts
probable cause to believe that it may be
found Id The rule articulated in Ross
has also been applied to consent searches
United States v Kapperman, 764 F 2d 786
(11th Cir 1985), United States v White,
706 F2d 806 (7th Cir 1983) See 3 W Laa physical relinquishment of the property See
United States v Kendall 655 F 2d 199 (9th Cir )
cert denied, 455 US 941, 102 S Ct 1434 71
LEd 2d 652 (1981) United States v Jackson,
544 F 2d 407 (9th Cir 1976)
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Fave, Search and Seizure § 8 1(c) at 16567 [a description of the objects to be sought
in search limits scope of that 9earch]

dence supporting the trial court's order
and, accordingly, we affirm

In essence, the State argues that Hueth
er's authonzation to Michels constituted
general consent to search his vehicle The
trial court found otherwise determining
that Michels exceeded the scope of Hueth
er's consent and conducted a general ex
ploratory search
We conclude that the
trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous

ERICKSTAD, C J , and VANDEWALL,
MESCHKE and GIERKE, JJ , concur

[121 Finally, the State argues that the
search was nevertheless valid because the
officer had probable cause to believe that
the bag might contain the open container
This argument fails for the same reason
the consent argument fails the district
court found that the bag could not reason
ably be expected to conceal an open con
tamer Ross, supra, 456 U S at 824, 102
S Ct at 2172 See State v Schinzing, 342
N W 2d 105, 109-110 (Minn 1983) [suggesting officer could not reasonably believe
that an open container could be in an ashtray]

STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
r.
Ross PICKAR, Defendant and Appellee.
Cr. No. 890270.
Supreme Court of North Dakota
March 27, 1990

In prosecution for two counts of manslaughter stemming from a single-vehicle
The district court found that the "paper roll-over accident in which two of defen*
sack [was] pushed partly under the front dant's friends were killed, defendant moved
seat in such a manner as to give the officer to suppress his confession The District
no reason to believe it contained a bottle or Court, Griggs County, Northeast Central
can
" The State disputes this finding, Judicial District Bruce E Bohlman, J ,
arguing, "It is not unreasonable for the granted defendant's motion upon determinofficer to believe that a can could have ing that the confession was involuntary
been quickly crushed, stuffed in the sack The State appealed The Supreme Court,
Levine, J , held that the trial court's findand hurriedly attempted, albeit unsuccess
fully, to be jammed under the seat " While ings with respect to the accused's physical
there is testimony to that effect there is and mental condition and prior experience
also contrary testimony which supports the with the police as well as with respect to
the coerciveness of the police conduct durdistrict court's finding
ing the interrogation, including the interro[13J The trial court is in a superior posi- gation techniques used by the police such
tion to judge the credibility of witnesses as playing on the accused's guilt and sense
and the weight to be accorded their testi- of duty to the family of his deceased
mony See State v Pickar, 453 N W 2d friends as well as offering the accused an
783 (N D 1990)
Conflicts in testimony implied inducement of no prosecution in the
must be resolved in favor of affirming the event of his confession, were not contrary
trial court Lorenzen, supra. In this in- to the manifest weight of the evidence and
supported the trial court's determination of
stance, affirming the trial court means af
firming the suppression order We con- involuntanness
clude that there is sufficient competent eviAffirmed

Cite u , Mont.. 641 P.2d 417

there was silent concerning the
> between the decedent and his
d it appears the verdict included
0 for nonpecuniary damages,
imount to be awarded for nonpenages is a question for the jury,
before us, there was no award
parents for their nonpecuniary
s jury in this case had awarded
wo or three thousand dollars
the medical and burial expenses,
» would be a more difficult one.
n a wrongful death action, the
ts is not required as a matter of
rd damages for any or all of the
authorized by K.S.A. 60-1904.
owever, must not disregard the
idence and award nothing when
clearly discloses an entitlement
i for at least some of the elewhich recovery is permitted,
before us convinces us the verladequate that it indicates pasejudice on the part of the jury
s a new trial.

adequate damages were awarded as a compromise on the issues of liability and damages. Corman, Administrator v. WEG Dial
Telephone, Inc., 194 Kan. 783, 402 P.2d 112;
Timmerman v. Schroeder, 203 Kan. 397,
401-02, 454 P.2d 522 (1969). In fairness to
the trial judge here, we note that plaintiffs
did not file a motion for a new trial; thus,
the trial judge had no opportunity to rule
on the adequacy of the verdict. Such a
motion is not necessary, however, for us to
consider the issue on appeal. Atkinson v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 5 Kan.App.2d
739, 625 P.2d 505, atfd on review, 230 Kan.
277, 634 P.2d 1071 (1981). The jury in this
case was instructed to fix damages without
considering the percentage of fault of the
parties. In view of the instruction on comparative fault, of the instruction not to
consider the percentage of fault in fixing
damages, and of the jury's finding of fault
within a range which we feel is supported
by the record, we are unable to say the
inadequate damages were awarded as a
compromise on the issue of liability.

The question arises whether
*e entitled to a new trial on all
one limited to the nature and
lamages. Prior to the advent of
\ negligence (K.S.A. 60-258a), a
ould be limited to the issue of
len that issue and liability were
id the interests of justice would
y a separate trial on the single
lew trial on both issues was
en the record indicated that in-

Reversed and remanded with directions
to grant a new trial on the issue of damages
only.
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STATE of Montana, Plaintiff
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Submitted Sept. 17, 1981.
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2. Searches and Seizures *»7(26)
Fact that defendant was overnight
guest in residence searched would not control determination of his standing to contest
legality of search of residence. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
3. Searches and Seizures <*=>7(26)
Where confiscated evidence was found
in areas where defendant slept and where
he stored his belongings and defendant was
sole occupant of residence at time of search
and had control and dominion over it to
exclusion of others, defendant did have
standing to contest search of premises in
which he was overnight guest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.

Defendant was convicted in the District Court of the First Judicial District, in
and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 4. Searches and Seizures *=»7(27)
Peter Meloy, J., of felony possession of danSearch and seizure disclaimer statute
gerous drugs, and he appealed. The Sumust be interpreted in light of Fifth
preme Court, Daly, J., held that: (1) deAmendment privilege against self-incrimifendant had standing to contest legality of
nation. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C.A.Const
search of residence where he was overnight
Amend.
5.
guest; (2) defendant had standing to contest search of his car and garbage bags 5. Searches and Seizures <*=»7(27)
found in its trunk even though he denied
Disclaimer of car does not necessarily
ownership of car at time of search; and (3) operate as disclaimer of closed containers in
district court erred in determining there car for purposes of search and seizure diswas probable cause for search warrant and, claimer statute. MCA 46-5-103(1).
thus, searches of house and car were in
violation of Fourth Amendment and evi- 6. Searches and Seizures <*=»7(26)
Although it has been held that owner
dence resulting from searches was not adof car or container will lose his standing to
missible against defendant.
object to search of it if he abandons it prior
Reversed and cause dismissed.
to time of search, mere disclaimer of ownerHaswell, C. J., and Sheehy, J., con- ship in effort to avoid making incriminating
curred in result.
statement in response to police questioning
Weber, J., dissented with opinion.
should not alone be deemed to constitute
abandonment. MCA 46-5-103(1).
1. Searches and Seizures *=»7(26)
Test for standing to challenge legality
of search is not to be based on distinctions
out of property and tort law and, rather,
legitimate expectation of privacy makes it
clear that capacity to claim protection of
the Fourth Amendment depends not upon
property right in invaded place, but upon
whether area was one in which there was
reasonable expectation of freedom from
government
intrusion.
U.S.C.A.Const
Amend. 4.

7. Searches and Seizures *»7(26)
The Miranda limitations should apply
to disclaimers when State uses them to
deprive a person of Fourth Amendment
standing.
MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 4, 5.
8. Searches and Seizures *=>7(26)
Where disclaimer was elicited from defendant by direct police questioning after
defendant was told to sit on couch and not
leave, State could not be allowed to use

defendant's disclaimer statements to deprive defendant of his standing to contest
search of his car and search of garbage
bags in its trunk. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.
C.A.Const.Amend8. 4, 5.
9. Searches and Seizures *»7(26)
Even assuming that defendant's disclaimer of ownership of car could be construed to deprive defendant of standing to
contest search of car, disclaimer could not
be construed to deprive defendant of standing to contest search of garbage bags found
in trunk of car. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C.
A.Const.Amends. 4, 5.
10. Searches and Seizures «=»3.6(2)
When a search warrant has been issued, determination of probable cause must
be made solely from information given to
impartial magistrate and from four corners
of search warrant application. U.S.C.A.
Con8t.Amend. 4.
11. Drugs and Narcotics *=»188
Where district court, in determining
probable cause to issue search warrant, considered not only four corners of search warrant application but looked to evidence that
one of parties involved was known drug
dealer and evidence of informant's tip, district court's determination of probable
cause was error and would be vacated.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.
12. Drugs and Narcotics «=»188
Where there was nothing in record
showing some of underlying circumstances
from which informant concluded that narcotics were where he claimed they were and
there was nothing in record showing underlying circumstances from which officer concluded that informant was credible or his
information was reliable, district court erroneously relied upon information received
from informant in determining whether
there was probable cause to issue search
warrant. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.
13. Searches and Seizures <*=> 3.6(2)
Probable cause to issue search warrant
exists when facts and circumstances
presented to magistrate would warrant an
honest belief in mind of reasonable and

prudent man that offense has been, or is
being, committed and that property sought
exists at place designated; in other words,
search warrant application must recite underlying facts and circumstances from
which magistrate can determine validity of
affiant's conclusion that certain evidence
exists at a particular premises. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
14. Searches and Seizures <*=>3.6(2)
Mere taking of opaque green garbage
bag out of residence and finding of similar
green garbage bag in alley near spot where
deputies lost sight of party they were following did not establish probable cause for
search of residence. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.
4.
15. Drugs ami Narcotics «=»188
Fact that affiant believed that vehicle
was used to convey marijuana and other
dangerous drugs to residence described was
not sufficient to establish probable cause to
search car parked in front of residence.
U.S.C.A.ConstAmend. 4.
16. Searches and Seizures <*=»3.6(2)
Mere affirmation of belief or suspicion
by police officer, absent any underlying
facts or circumstances, does not establish
probable cause for issuance of search warrant. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.
Leo Gallagher argued, Helena, for defendant and appellant.
Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., John Maynard,
Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Charles Graveley,
County Atty., Steve Garrison, Deputy
County Atty., argued, Helena, for plaintiff
and respondent
DALY, Justice.

Defendant was charged by information
with possession of dangerous drugs with
intent to sell, as provided in section 45-9103(1), MCA. He pleaded not guilty. His
motion to suppress was denied by the District Court of the First Judicial District,
Lewis and Clark County. After a jury trial
defendant was found guilty of felony pos-
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session of dangerous drugs, a lesser included offense of possession with intent to sell.
On October 15, 1980, the defendant was
sentenced to five years in the Montana
State Prison, with two years suspended.
Defendant appeals his conviction.
Based on information from an informant,
the Lewis and Clark County Sheriffs Department placed under surveillance the residence located at 1014 Elm Street, Helena,
Montana. About noon on January 11,1980,
two deputy sheriffs observed a man later
identified as John Stemple, a suspected
drug dealer, leave the Elm Street residence.
He was carrying a large green garbage bag
which he put into a tool box in the back of
his pickup truck parked in front of the
residence.
Stemple went back into the residence. A
brown Ford station wagon pulled up. A
man later identified as the defendant got
out of the station wagon and went into the
residence. Stemple then left the residence
and drove away in his pickup, followed by
the two deputies in an unmarked car.
According to the deputies, Stemple made
evasive maneuvers by turning several corners sharply. They lost sight of Stemple
and called for the aid of a third officer.
The third officer stopped Stemple within a
matter of minutes.
The officers searched Stemple's truck but
could not find the green garbage bag that
Stemple had placed in the tool box. Because of a recent snowfall the officers were
able to retrace the tracks of the pickup.
The tracks led to an alley behind a gas
station where they found a large green
garbage bag which apparently had been
placed there recently since it was not covered with snow. The deputies looked inside
the bag and found it full of marijuana
contained in small plastic bags.
An officer went to get a search warrant
for the Elm Street residence and for a
maroon Chrysler Cordoba parked in front of
the residence which the officers believed
had been used to transport narcotics. A
search warrant for both the residence and
the car was issued by a justice of the peace.
The warrant application contained the

above information, except there was
mention of the surveillance being based
an informant's tip and no mention Ui
John Stemple was a suspected drug deal
At least eight officers and the couri
attorney executed the search warrai
When the officers arrived at the Elm Strc
residence, they noticed that the motor w
running on the Chrysler. A couple of of
cers stayed with the car, while the oth<
went to search the residence. Defends
answered the door of the residence. T
officers handed him the search warrant
they entered. Defendant was only weari
a pair of blue jeans. He testified that
was half-dressed because he was getti
ready to take a shower. Defendant *
ordered to sit on the couch and not to lea
the room.
Defendant was the only occupant of 1
residence when the officers entered,
was a guest of his uncle who rented 1
residence. He had been sleeping on 1
couch in the living room and had stored
belongings in the living room and in a hi
room.
The officers searched the entire hou
finding marijuana residue and drug pa
phernalia in nearly every room, includi
the living room, bathroom and kitchen,
small plastic bag of marijuana was found
the bedroom of defendant's uncle.
One uniformed officer was told to 0
with defendant and watch him while
others completed the search. He asked
fendant if he owned the car parked in fr
of the residence Defendant said he did
own the car. In response to further qi
tioning, defendant said he did not kr
who did own the car and did not kr
where the keys to the car's trunk w
located. Defendant was not arrested pi
to these questions and had not been give
Miranda warning.
The officers searched the car. U]
finding the glove compartment and
trunk locked, they forced the glove OJ
partment open, and inside it they four*
key to open the trunk. Inside the trunk
officers found several large green garb

STATE v. ISOM
r* which contained approximately eighty
In overruling the automatic standing rule
ninety pounds of marijuana. After the
in
Jones, both Salvucci and Rawlings relied
rch of the residence and the car, defendheavily
upon the earlier case of Rakas v.
was arrested.
Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58
X the suppression hearing, defendant in- L.Ed.2d 387.
iuced evidence to show that he owned
In Rakas, the Court stated that the Jones
car in which the marijuana was found, test of "legitimately on the premises" canhis case may be resolved by looking at not be taken in its full sweep beyond the
three primary issues presented:
facts of that one case. Rather, said the
Whether the defendant has standing Court, the true test of whether a Fourth
:>ntest the legality of the search of the Amendment right has been violated is
lence where he was an overnight guest; found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389
Whether the defendant has standing U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, in
ontest the search of his car and the which the Supreme Court said that the caage bags found in its trunk when he pacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
id ownership of the car at the time of Amendment depends not upon a property
earch; and
right in the invaded place but upon whether
Whether the District Court erred in the person who claims the protection of the
snial of defendant's motion to suppress Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expecnee seized from the residence and the tation of privacy in the invaded place.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct at 512;
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct at 430.
th respect to defendant's standing to
[1] Notwithstanding the limitations
st the search of the house, the State
1 have this Court adopt the perspective placed on Jones, the Court in Rakas, and
•easoning of the most recent United again in Salvucci, emphasized that ownerB Supreme Court decisions which have ship is not a key element in determining
jled the automatic standing rule of standing. The test for standing is not to be
v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, based on distinctions out of property and
Dt 726, 4 LEd.2d 697. See, United tort law: "In defining the scope of that
i v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 interest, we adhere to the view expressed in
2647, 65 LEd.2d 619, and Rawlings v. Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane
\cky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct distinctions in property and tort law be55 L.Ed.2d 633.
tween guests, licensees, invitees, and the
as had set down two alternative hold- like ought not to control." See Jones, 362
(1) when the fruits of a search are U.S. at 266, 80 S.Ct at 733; Rakas, 439 U.S.
ed to be used against a defendant at at 143, 99 S.Ct at 430; Salvucci, US U.S. at
ial, he has "automatic standing" to 91, 100 S.Ct at 2553; and Rawlings, 448
t the legality of the search; and (2) U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct at 2561. The controli "legitimately on the premises where ling view, then, seems to be that expressed
3h occurs may challenge its legality in Mancusi v. DeForte (1968), 392 U.S. 364,
y of a motion to suppress". Jones, 88 S.Ct 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154, in which the
9. at 267, 80 S.Ct at 734. The pur- Court said that the Katx teat of." legiti' the automatic standing rule was to mate expectation of privacy' makes it clear
,he "vice of prosecutorial self-con tra- that capacity to claim the protection of the
' in which the State could charge a Fourth Amendment depends not upon a
with possession as a crime, and at property right in the invaded place, but
le time claim that the possession was upon whether the area was one in which
ficient to give the person standing to there was a reasonable expectation of freere the legality of the search or sei- dom from governmental intrusion." See
lee, Brown v. United States (1973), Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368, 88 S.Ct at 2124.
. 223, 93 S.Ct 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208. (Emphasis added.)
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Following the rationale that ownership is
not the controlling factor in the determination of standing, although it is one factor to
consider, the Supreme Court has pointed
out that the actual holding in Jones was not
overruled. In Rawlings, the Court referred
to parts of Rakas which explained why the
defendant in Jones would still have standing under the recent narrow tests for standing. The Court in Rakas reasoned that the
defendant in Jones, who was using an
apartment with the tenant's permission,
would continue to have standing under the
recent tests because the defendant "had
complete dominion and control over the
apartment and could exclude others from
it." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433.
The Court in Rakas also reasoned that the
defendant in Katz, who was in a phone
booth, had standing to contest a search of
the booth because he had an expectation of
privacy when he "shut the door behind him
to exclude all others and paid the toll."
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433.
In State v. Allen (1980), Mont, 612 P.2d
199, 37 St.Rep. 919, this Court quoted extensively from Rakas, acknowledging the
distinctions between Rakas, Jones and Katz.
See, Allen, 612 P.2d at 201-202.
Here, the District Court made two findings of fact that relate to defendant's
standing to contest the search of the residence: (1) that defendant was an overnight
guest at the residence which was rented by
his uncle; and (2) that defendant had
stored clothing, luggage and other personal
property in limited areas of the residence,
none of which included the areas where the
confiscated evidence was found.
Based on the above findings, the District
Court concluded as a matter of law that
"the defendant, being an overnight guest in
the residence with items stored only in a
limited area therein, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas where the
items were found, therefore, has no standing to object to their admission."
The fact that the defendant was an overnight guest should not control the determination of standing, although it is one factor
to consider. As was noted in the above

discussion, protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures does not depend upon
a property right in the invaded place, but
rather upon whether the area was one in
which there was a reasonable expectation
of freedom from governmental intrusion.
See, Allen, 612 P.2d at 202.
Moreover, although the order of the District Court must be presumed correct upon
appeal, State v. District Court (1978), 176
Mont. 257, 577 P.2d 849, the record clearly
does not support the finding that confiscated evidence was not found in the areas
where defendant had stored his persona)
belongings. Uncontradicted testimony at
the suppression hearing showed that defendant slept on the living room couch
while he was the guest of his uncle and that
he stored his belongings in the living room
and in his nephew's bedroom. Although
evidence at the suppression hearing showed
that his uncle's bedroom was the only area
where a small bag of marijuana was seized,
it was made clear at the trial that evidence
was seized from the living room table, from
the living room fireplace, beside a wall in
the living room, and from the living room
closet.
Defendant was the sole occupant of the
house at the time the search was made.
Like the defendants in Jones and Katz,
defendant could exclude all others except
his uncle and family and had dominion and
control over the premises at the time the
officers entered the residence.
[2,3] In summary, the District Court's
conclusion that defendant lacked standing
to contest the search of the premises must
be reversed on the following grounds: (1)
the fact that the defendant was an overnight guest should not control a determination of his standing to contest the legality
of a search_of the residence; (2) the record
shows that confiscated evidence was found
in areas where the defendant slept and
where he stored his belongings; and (3) the
record supports a finding that the defendant was the sole occupant of the residence
at the time of the search and had control
and dominion over it to the exclusion of
others.

The State urges this Court that the next
issue which must be discussed is whether
defendant had standing to contest the
search of his car. The State claims that
because defendant denied his ownership of
the car, he waived his Fourth Amendment
rights in it and in the garbage bags found
in its trunk.
The State argues that section 46-5103(1), MCA, deprives the defendant of
standing to contest the search of his car and
the search of the garbage bags found in its
trunk. Section 46-6-103(1), MCA, provides:
"No search and seizure, whether with or
without warrant, shall be held illegal as
to a defendant if:
"(1) the defendant has disclaimed any
right to or interest in the place or object
searched or the instruments, articles, or
things seized;"
[4,5] The State's argument fails for two
reasons: the disclaimer statute must be interpreted in light of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination; and, a
disclaimer of a car does not necessarily o|>erate as a disclaimer of the closed containers in the car.
[6] Although it has been held that the
owner of a car or a container will lose his
standing to object to the search of it if he
abandons it prior to the time of the search,
United States v. Anderson (5th Cir. 1974),
500 F.2d 1311; United States v. Colbert
(5th Cir. 1973), 474 F.2d 174; and United
States v. Afi7/er (1st Cir. 1978), 589 F.2d
1117, a mere disclaimer of ownership in an
effort to avoid making an incriminating
statement in response to police questioning
should not alone be deemed to constitute
abandonment. See, LaFave, Search and
Seizure, Vol. 3 at 581. Given the position
that a defendant does not otherwise have to
incriminate himself to preserve his Fourth
Amendment rights, as in Simmons v. Unit*
ed States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967,
19 L.Ed.2d 1247, it is difficult to understand
how a refusal to make incriminating admissions in response to police interrogation can
be held to deprive a person of Fourth
Amendment standing.

To say that there is no Fifth Amendment
violation because the defendant could have
simply chosen to be silent is to ignore the
whole line of principles set down in Miranda
and its progeny. Miranda v. Arizona
(1966), 884 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694.
The point of the Miranda warning was to
provide a safeguard against the coercive
pressures of in-custody interrogation by police, when those pressures are so great as to
undermine an individual's will, compelling
him to speak when he would not otherwise
do so. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624.
"Custodial interrogation" was found to be
inherently coercive. The Miranda Court
defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" 384
U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
[7] Clearly, the Miranda limitations
should apply to disclaimers when the State
uses them to deprive a person of Fourth
Amendment standing.
[8] Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests that the disclaimer resulted from "custodial interrogation." The defendant was told to sit on the couch and not
leave. A uniformed officer was ordered to
watch the defendant and stay with him
while five other officers searched the house.
The defendant was not free to walk around
the house. The disclaimer was elicited from
defendant by direct police questioning.
Given this coercive atmosphere and the
questioning, the State cannot be allowed to
use such statements to deprive defendant of
his Fourth Amendment rights.
[9] Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment limitations on section 46-5-103(1),
MCA, and assuming that the disclaimer
could be construed to deprive the defendant
of standing to contest the search of the car,
in light of Robbins v. California (1981), 453
U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744,
the disclaimer could not be construed to
deprive the defendant of standing to con-
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test the search of the garbage bags found trate. Rather, the District Court loc
whether the officers had probable a
in the trunk of the car.
search
the residence and the vehicle
In Robbins, the Court held that while
police may have conducted a lawful search in front of the residence. The I
of an automobile under the automobile ex- Court made the following conclusi
ception, they must nevertheless secure a law:
"The officer's observation of John
warrant for any container found in the
pie leaving the duplex with a g
trunk of the car. The Court recognized
bag later found to contain mar
that the expectation of privacy in a closed
when joined with the with prior
container taken from a car is not necessariedge
of his drug sale involvemei
ly less than the privacy expectation in
the information that the officers >
closed pieces of luggage found elsewhere.
ceived regarding the incoming ma,
Following a similar reasoning, it cannot
shipment, gave the officers pi
be said that the defendant lost his expectacause to believe that dangerous di
tion of privacy in the opaque garbage bags
evidence of its possession would be
when he disclaimed ownership of the car.
in the premises searched and in th
While it is arguable that the disclaimer
cle searched." Conclusion of Law
weakened the defendant's expectation of
(Emphasis added.)
privacy in the car, it cannot be said to have
"The search of the automobile wi
affected his expectation of privacy in the
justifiable under the automobile
garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore, in
tion to the search warrant requin
no way affected defendant's standing to
since there was both probable cau
contest the search of the garbage bags.
exigent circumstances. The fact th
dence of dangerous drugs were fo
[10] The next issue which must be disthe residence added to and enhaw
cussed is whether the District Court properprobable cause had by the officers
ly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
subsequent Carroll search of the a
As many cases in Montana have held, when
bile." Conclusion of Law No. 4.
a search warrant has been issued, the determination of probable cause must be made
From these conclusions of law, it i
solely from the information given to the the District Court, in making its deU
impartial magistrate and from the four cor- tion of probable cause for the aean
ners of the search warrant application. the residence and the car, looked
See, Art. II, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont.Const.; the four corners of the search warr
Thomson v. Onstad (1979), 182 Mont. 119, plication and was thereby in error,
594 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 910; State v. above conclusions, the District Court
Olson (1979), 181 Mont. 323, 589 P.2d 663, 36 to evidence that John Stemple was a
St.Rep. 146; State v. Leistiko (1978), 176 drug dealer and evidence of an infoi
Mont. 434, 578 P.2d 1161; State ex rel. tip, neither of which were contained
Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 search warrant or the warrant's appl
Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; Application of
[12] Moreover, the District Cou
Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532.
liance upon the information receive
[11] Here the evidence is uncontradicted the informant was error since the
that the only information given to the jus- nothing in the record to satisfy t\
tice of the peace was the information con- pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas (19
tained in the search warrant and the search U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 7
warrant application. Nevertheless, the Dis- Spinelli v. United States (1969), 3J
trict Court, in its order denying the motion 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 LEd.2d 637.
to suppress, did not look to the validity of was nothing in the record which
the search warrant and the sufficiency of "some of the underlying circum
the information before the neutral magis- from which the informant conclud
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narcotics were where he claimed they
i" and there was nothing in the record
ring "the underlying circumstances
i which the officer concluded that the
mant . . . was 'credible' or his informawas 'reliable'." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at
84 S.Ct. at 1514. See also, Leistiko, 578
at 1163.
ie District Court's determination of
able cause must, therefore, be vacated,
a new determination of probable cause
be made by looking to the four corof the search warrant application it-

[14] Stemple's mere taking of an
opaque green garbage bag out of a residence and the finding of a similar green
garbage bag in an alley near the spot where
the deputies lost sight of Stemple's truck
were the facts presented to the justice of
the peace. Such facts do not establish probable cause for the search of the residence.
The connection between the bag found in
the alley and the residence is tenuous at
best.

[15,16] Likewise, the search warrant
application fails to set out any underlying
I] It is well established in this state facts or circumstances that establish probatype of facts must be contained in a ble cause to search the car parked in front
h warrant application:
of the residence. The only reference to the
. . . Affidavits relied upon for the is- car in the search warrant is:
ince of search warrants in both federal
" . . . that the resident of the above ded state prosecutions must contain suffiscribed duplex unit is the owner and was
nt facts to enable an impartial commisthe driver of the described car when it
ner or magistrate to determine whetharrived at the described residence early in
probable cause exists under the Fourth
the morning of January 11, 1980 and your
nendment . . . ' " State ex rel. Garris
affiant believes that said vehicle was
Wilson (1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d
used to convey the marijuana and other
17, quoting Application of Gray
dangerous drugs to the residence describ70), 155 Mont 510, 473 P.2d 532.
ed..." (Emphasis added.)
>bable cause exists when the facts and
mstances presented to the magistrate A mere affirmance of belief or suspicion by
i warrant an honest belief in the mind a police officer, absent any underlying facts
reasonable and prudent man that the or circumstances, does not establish probase has been, or is being, committed ble cause for the issuance of a search war'that the property sought exists at the rant See, Application of Gray, supra, 473
designated" See, State v. Robinette P.2d at 536; Nathanson, supra.
1978), 270 N.W.2d 573, 577. In other
Absent probable cause, the searches of
i, the search warrant application must
the
house and car were in violation of the
i the underlying facts and circumstancom which the magistrate can deter- Fourth Amendment, and the evidence rethe validity of the affiant's conclusion sulting from these searches is not admissicertain evidence exists at a particular ble against the defendant Mapp v. Ohio
[set. Nathanson v. United States (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684,6 L.Ed.2d
), 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 1081.
see also, Aguilar, supra; United States
Clearly, the introduction into evidence of
ntresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. the marijuana seized from the house and
13 L.Ed.2d 684; and Giordenello v. car constitutes reversible error since such
d States (1958), 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct evidence contributed to the conviction of
2 L.Ed.2d 1503.
the defendant. State v. Langan (1968), 151
re the facts given to the justice of the Mont. 558, 445 P.2d 565; State v. West
sufficient to indicate that marijuana (1980), Mont, 617 P.2d 1298, 37 St.Rep. 1772.
ocated at the residence or in the car Since no other evidence introduced at trial
d in front of the residence? We think would support a conviction, a new trial cannot be granted.
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The judgment of the District Court is
reversed and the cause dismissed.
MORRISON, J., concurs.
HASWELL, Chief Justice, concurring:
I concur in the result.
SHEEHY, Justice, concurring:
I concur in the result.
WEBER, Justice, dissents:
I would hold that the defendant does not
have standing to contest the search of his
car and the objects inside the car. A review of the search and seizure provisions of
our code is enlightening. Section 46-5-101,
MCA, describes the basis for a search and
seizure and applies where a search is made
incident to a lawful arrest, by the authority
of a valid search warrant, under the authority of a right of lawful inspection, and of
particular import here, "with the consent of
the accused . . . " Here, section 46-5-101 is
not applicable in any way. Note that if the
defendant had consented to the search of
his automobile, the code section would have
been applicable. Section 46-5-102, MCA,
describes the manner in which a peace officer may search following a lawful arrest,
and again, this section is not directly applicable. Next, section 46-5-103, MCA, the
section quoted in the majority opinion, provides in part:
M
No search and seizure, whether with or
without warrant shall be held to be illegal as to a defendant if:
"(1) the defendant has disclaimed any
right to or interest in the . . . object
searched or the instruments, articles, or
things seized." (Underscoring added.)
Section 46-5-103, MCA, is a codification of
the rule established by this Court in State v.
Nelson (1956), 130 Mont 466, 304 P.2d 1110.
The Court affirmed the refusal of the District Court to suppress evidence seized in a
search of an automobile without a search
warrant, where the defendant Nelson had
disclaimed any ownership or right to possession of the car or of any property taken
therefrom. This Court quoted from an earlier Montana case and stated:

"What was said by this court in State ex
rel. Teague v. District Court [1925], 73
Mont. 438, 441, 236 [P.] page 257, 258,
rules this case so far as the motion to
suppress is concerned. There this court
said:
" 'Although the acts of the officers in
searching this tunnel and seizing the still
and mash found in it may have been
unlawful as to the possessors of the tunnel, since relator disclaimed the right of
possession of both the tunnel and its contents, he is not in a position to complain,
as according to his own statements, he
had no right in them and the acts of the
officers therefore were not unlawful as to
him. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities to sustain this determination,
but reference is made to Driskill v. UniU
ed States, 8 Cir., 281 F. 146, and Keith v.
Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42.
In each of which a like result was reached
under analogous facts.'
"This is the rule throughout the country,
see annotations in 24 A.L.R., page 1425;
32 A.L.R., page 415; 41 A.L.R., page
1151; 52 A.L.R., page 487; 88 A.LR,
page 365; et seq.; 134 A.L.R., page 831;
150 AX.R, page 577." State v. Nelson,
130 Mont at 471, 304 P.2d at 1113.
This decision has not been overruled or
modified.
The same view is expressed in Elledge v.
United States fcth Cir. 1966), 359 F.2d 404,
in which the Court of Appeals denied the
motion to suppress evidence, where, in response to an officer's question as to what
was in a package, the defendant had said,
"I don't know. It's not mine." The court
stated in part:
"Such disclaimer of ownership by the appellant is analogous to abandonment Cf.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241,
80 S.Ct 683, [698] 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (I960).
In both cases the same message, by act or
word, is delivered to the officer: that as
to the actor or speaker there is no interest which would be invaded by search or
seizure. Lack of warrant does not under
these circumstances render search or sei-
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zure unreasonable as to the actor or
speaker." Elledge v. United States, 359
F.2d at 405.
In a similar manner, in Rakas v. Illinois
(1978), 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425,
58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, the Court stated:
"A person who is aggrieved by an illegal
search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by
a search of a third person's premises or
property has not had any of his Fourth
Amendment rights infringed." (Underscoring added.)
An extended discussion of cases with similar holdings does not appear appropriate.
We do note that Wayne LaFave, a leading
authority on search and seizure, distinguishes between abandonment and disclaimer of ownership. LaFave takes the
position that disclaimer of ownership should
not be held tantamount to a waiver of
Fourth Amendment protection, but notes
that a number of courts have so held. W.
LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 11.3 (1978,
Supp.1981).

"Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for
the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is
kept from the trier of fact and the search
for truth at trial is deflected. (Citations
omitted)."
I would hold that the District Court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search
of the car.
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Harry G. and Lillian MARTZ, husband
and wife, et at, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
BUTTE-SILVER BOW GOVERNMENT,
State of Montana, et aL, Defendants
and Appellants.

Recent United States Supreme Court
No. 81-237.
cases involving the question of standing to
challenge the legality of searches, have emSupreme Court of Montana.
phasized the importance of a defendant's
Submitted Oct. 27, 1981.
legitimate or reasonable expectation of priDecided Jan. 26, 1982.
vacy in the premises or objects searched.
Rakas, supra; United States v. Salvucei
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1982.
(1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65
L.Ed.2d 619; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980),
Property owners brought action
448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633.
I am unable to see how the defendant could against governmental unit and state chalhave had a reasonable expectation of priva- lenging zoning ordinance. The District
cy in opaque bags in the trunk of a car, Court of the Second Judicial District, in and
when he had stated he did not own the car, for the County of Silver Bow, Arnold Olsen,
he did not know who did own the car, and P. J., entered summary judgment for prophe did not know where the keys to the car's erty owners, and defendants appealed. The
Supreme Court, Weber, J., held that: (1)
trunk were located.
ordinance was not enacted in violation of
The unfortunate result of the majority
Montana laws governing zoning, and (2)
opinion is that, once again, reliable evidence
evidence presented material question of
establishing a clear basis for conviction is
fact as to whether ordinance unconstitusuppressed. The majority's broad applicationally excluded mobile homes and mobile
tion of the exclusionary rule has again exhome parks, thus, precluding summary
acted a substantial social cost. As stated in
judgment.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137, 99 S.Ct. at
Reversed and remanded.
427, 58 L.Ed.2d at 397:

1. Zoning and Planning *»30
Jurisdictional area referred to in statutory sections indicating need for master
plan for jurisdictional area is that of planning board. MCA 76-2-101 et seq., 76-2201.

The following issues are \
Court for review:
(1) Did the District Court
ing that Ordinance No. 53 i
in accordance with Montani
planning and zoning?
2. Zoning and Planning <*»30
(2) Did the District Cour
Where council of commissioners, in en- Ordinance No. 53 unconstil
acting zoning ordinance which covered the of its exclusionary effect o
entire jurisdictional area of old city-county and mobile home parks?
planning board, but no more, relied upon
(3) Did the District Cou
properly enacted comprehensive plan for granted plaintiffs' amend
entire jurisdictional area of planning board summary judgment?
which developed that plan, ordinance was
On March 14, 1972, the B
enacted in compliance with Montana law City-County Planning Bo
and did not conflict with statute limiting comprehensive master plan
extension of municipal zoning to three miles Butte and portions of Silv<
beyond city limits of larger cities. MCA The master plan covered th<
76-1-501 et seq., 76-1-505, 76-2-101 et tional area of that Planning
seq., 76-2-201, 76-2-310(2).
accepted by both the city f
the county government
3. Judgment <*=> 181(15)
In property owner's action against gov- months.
In May of 1977, the City c
ernmental entity, and state of Montana,
challenging zoning ordinance, material issue County of Silver Bow com
of fact existed as to whether ordinance had single political entity know
unconstitutionally exclusionary effect upon ver Bow/' the jurisdictiona
mobile homes and mobile home parks, thus, was all of Silver Bow Couni
erville.
precluding summary judgment.
In August of 1978, the
Butte-Silver Bow approved
Robert M. McCarthy argued, County dinance No. 53, which ha
Atty., Butte, for defendants and appellants. mended to them in January
Cannon, Parish & Sheehy, Helena, Ross old City-County Planning I
W. Cannon argued and Edmund F. Sheehy the Zoning Commission. 0
argued, Helena, for plaintiffs and respon- covered the entire jurisdicti
dents.
old City-Planning Board, bi
the time it was enacted, tl
WEBER, Justice.
ment of Butte-Silver Bow )
Defendant appeals from summary judg- board and no comprehensi
ment in the District Court of Butte-Silver total jurisdictional area.
Bow in which Butte-Silver Bow Ordinance
Ordinance No. 53 zones
No. 53 was found to be (1) invalid because it 134.3 acres comprising the
was enacted in violation of Montana laws and land within four-and-oi
governing zoning, and (2) unconstitutionally the Butte city limits prior 1
exclusive because it restricted mobile homes Ordinance No. 53 permits n
and mobile home parks to an impermissibly private lots in areas zoned
small percentage of the area zoned. We but permits mobile home p.
vacate the summary judgment and remand eas zoned R-4. The minir
to the District Court for further proceed- areas zoned R-4S is one ac
ing*.
total area zoned is zoned

